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
1 OCT 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Procedures for the Handling of Intelligence Requirements

Attached per your request of 20 September is a description of the procedures followed for generating, levying, monitoring and satisfying of intelligence requirements. Attached also are samples of various types of intelligence gap statements and intelligence collection requirements. The paper has the concurrence of DDP and DDS&T, although the latter notes that the procedures described are more applicable to the Intelligence Directorate than to the S & T Directorate.



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(A. S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Attachments: a/s

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

DDI

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MEMORANDUM:

These are the steps by which intelligence gaps are identified and action instituted to rectify the situation:

1. Recognition of a Need for Additional Information

The analyst should continually search for ways to make his knowledge of his subject matter more complete. In surveying his field of interest, he should determine what he does not know and what he must know in order to produce the most professional work possible. An intelligence gap is thus identified. A specific and formal example of this process is a Post Mortem to a National Estimate which states in general terms what important elements were not known about the subject when the estimate was written.

2. Development of an Intelligence Requirement

Having identified his need for new information, the analyst should go to the DBI's Collection Guidance Staff for aid in expressing his need to the appropriate collectors. An intelligence collection requirement is then written and assigned to a CBS officer for levying and followup monitoring.

3. Levying of Requirements on Intelligence Collectors

Depending on the type of information needed, its urgency and the capabilities of the various collection agencies, requirements are then levied on one or more agencies. They may also be given wider dissemination by being included in the CBS's Current Intelligence Requirements List which is distributed to all human source collection agencies and to NSA. If an information need is particularly urgent or complicated, it may be referred to one of the USIB Committees, such as COMOR, the SIGINT Committee, the IPC, or the Critical Collection Problems Committee, or it may be stated as a Priority National Intelligence Objective, in which case it is

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automatically assigned to all agencies for collection or analytical action. When a requirement is accepted by a collection agency, the manner of execution is the responsibility of that agency.

4. Monitoring Collection Action

The CGS maintains a machine file of all outstanding requirements to eliminate duplication of requirements and to close cases outdated by new needs. CGS monitors the flow of information in response to the requirements and, as new collection opportunities arise, may refer the requirement to additional agencies.


5. Feedback of New Information to Analytical Elements

New information from the collectors is returned to the analyst as partial or complete fulfillment of the original requirement. The new information gives the analyst new insight into his subject matter and should raise additional, more refined, questions in the mind of the analyst. These questions should appear as new, more penetrating, statements of intelligence gaps and give rise to new requirements. The above process is then repeated.

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INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT FLOW CHART



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These are the procedures by which Intelligence Estimates and Post Mortems to estimates are initiated:

National Intelligence Estimates are either self-initiated by ONE as annual papers on important subjects or new estimates or updates of older papers, or they are requested by another USIB agency or consumer. A program of forthcoming estimates is drawn up each quarter.

Special National Intelligence Estimates, which concern developments in crisis or near-crisis situations, are usually requested on short notice by the White House Staff, State, the DoD or the DCI.

Post Mortems to estimates are written when it is recognized that important elements of information were not available for preparation of the estimate. In such cases the Board of National Estimates will recommend to the USIB that individual agencies take appropriate steps to fill the gaps noted in the Post Mortems, and, in unusually important cases, that the matter be turned over to the Critical Collection Problems Committee for recommendation on remedial collection action.

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8 SEP 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Reorganization of DDI

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation, in paragraph 17 below, for your approval.

2. As you know, I have been studying the DDI organization for several months to insure that our budget and manpower resources are in balance with our essential long-term tasks. I have also been seeking ways to increase our efficiency and the quality of our product and, if possible, effect reductions in personnel assigned to present tasks wherever consolidation or centralization of effort would permit.

3. My review to date has led to two main conclusions:

- a. All non-operational intelligence research and analysis activities in CIA should be reconsolidated under one Directorate; and,
- b. The finished intelligence production components of the Directorate of Intelligence should as far as functional specialties allow be placed under unified direction and organized on a regional or area-oriented basis, and this regional organization should be closely linked by exchange of staff officers with the Area Divisions of DEP.

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4. This memorandum deals with the first of these conclusions. I present it now, with the second to follow, because you recently spoke to me of your belief that similar functions should be grouped under single management and duplication eliminated in order to effect savings in use of manpower. I suggest the rigorous application of this principle to the intelligence research and analysis effort, one of CIA's most essential functions and the one which our most important customers are daily aware of.

BACKGROUND

25X1 5. From its first days the Agency's guiding policy for the production of finished intelligence by CIA has been that it shall be integrated, coordinated and non-duplicatory. This policy is still in force and currently set forth in [] which also provides that the Deputy Director for Intelligence is responsible for ensuring that the policy is implemented, including dissemination control and the initiation of new publications.

6. In 1963, the DCI transferred the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) from DDI to DDC&T, entirely, I believe, in an effort to collocate scientists and to provide a nucleus of personnel actually on duty around which the S&T Directorate could be organized. This immediately created production problems, which I pointed out at the time and which have been only reduced since, not solved. The validity of the policy of placing overall responsibility for intelligence production in the DDI was reaffirmed shortly after the creation of the S&T Directorate, and attempts made to provide for its implementation in full force by oral and written directives.

7. The directive in which this was most explicitly set forth is the DDCI's memorandum of 30 October 1963 to the deputies on the subject of relationships between DDI and DDC&T. This memorandum provides that:

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"2. Over-all responsibility for production and publication of finished intelligence, and its dissemination outside of CIA, remains assigned to the BDI.

"3. The DDS&T carries the basic responsibility for the production and publication of scientific and technical intelligence. Dissemination outside of CIA will have prior BDI coordination.

"4. The BDI carries the basic responsibility for the integration of scientific and technical intelligence produced by DDS&T with other types of intelligence in the development of finished intelligence.

"5. The BDI will coordinate all finished intelligence which incorporates scientific and technical material with the DDS&T prior to dissemination outside CIA, using existing channels for this coordination.

.

"11. The BDI is responsible for establishing the CIA position on all USIB matters. He will rely heavily on the DDS&T in framing the Agency position on matters which are primarily scientific and technical and will ensure that unresolved substantive differences between DDS&T and Board Estimates are clearly evident. The BDI will furnish the DDS&T with copies of all pertinent USIB briefing memoranda for the DDCI and DCI."

8. Arrangements for producing intelligence pursuant to that directive have worked as well as could be expected considering the difficulties inherent in a situation where the Agency's production capability has been fractured and

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its parts placed under two deputies with widely differing responsibilities and goals. I have never felt that it has worked well enough, or in fact could be made to work well enough, under divided line-of-command authority.

DISCUSSION

9. For obvious reasons, my current review of this problem has not been in detail. I have not, for example, held discussions with OSI personnel concerning the internal operations of that office. I have done even less in the case of FMSAC, but in view of DDC&T's plan to transfer the Ballistic Missiles and Space Division from OSI to FMSAC thereby creating another fracture in the finished intelligence base, I feel it must also be considered in any plan to alter the present organization.

10. There are, I believe, a number of reasons, some compelling, others merely persuasive, for considering at this time the return of OSI to DDI. The reasons for its staying in the DDC&T are to me not very persuasive. (The question of FMSAC, an outgrowth from the former Ballistics Branch of OSI, has similar aspects. I would only say here that it should probably be reincorporated into OSI. If not, it has a good deal more to do with end-product reporting than do other DDC&T activities other than OSI, and therefore it should come to DDI as well.)

11. I should say a word about my general scheme for consolidating components and integrating production in order to place the OSI proposed move in context, though the merits of the move in no way depend upon a general reorganization of DDI. The tentative scheme (blocked out in Tab A) calls for four main grouping of offices:

- a. Imagery Analysis (NPIC, CIA Detachment)
- b. Information Services (OCR)
- c. Intelligence Research Group (ORR/ERA, ORR/MRA, OSI, FMSAC)

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- d. National Intelligence Group (ONE, OCI, OCR/BR, OSI, organized insofar as possible on a geographic basis -- e.g., Office of Chinese Affairs)

12. As indicated in c above, OSI would be in the Intelligence Research Group (see Tab B for present command line and Tab C for proposed grouping).

13. The advantages to you of having OSI in the DDI seem to me these:

- a. It would improve our intelligence product.

Intelligence problems at the level of national interest are not disciplinary but interdisciplinary. It is important to the quality of output to focus all pertinent disciplines on a given problem in an integrated fashion. Mixed management makes the attainment of this difficult goal more difficult.

- b. It would improve our research programming effort.

By consolidating our research programming efforts into one, we would have a better balanced overall program more responsive to our consumers.

- c. It would improve the efficiency of our operations.

We could, for example, restructure the staffing arrangements, consolidating administrative staffs, production control staffs, including the review and editing functions, dealing with the printers, production for support of current intelligence, typing, etc. In short, there would be fewer people doing the same type of work now done by different research components in parallel, with a commensurate reduction in overhead direction.

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d. Some duplication of effort would be avoided.

OSI and ORR deal with different aspects of the same matters, in great part consulting the same evidence. OSI covers the R&D aspects; ORR covers production and deployment. Both to some extent have to deal with weapons characteristics. In a variety of fields -- electronics and chemicals for instance -- OSI is concerned with new products and qualitative factors, ORR with current production and quantitative factors.

e. We could redress a trend away from production.

Since the transfer out of DDI, we have noted a depreciation of the scientific intelligence output, attributable, we believe, to a natural preoccupation with intelligence support of the technical collection activities owing to the environment in which OSI now finds itself.

f. We can guarantee you some outright economies.

Though total T/O savings cannot now be specifically arrived at, they would be more than nominal and could be made in the face of improving production. Preliminary calculations on the basis of the present OSI [] lead me to conclude that a minimum cut of 5% -- [] can be guaranteed, and that the total may well be more. (See Tab D for our arithmetic.)

14. On the negative side, this move would separate scientists from scientists, the bringing together of which was the principal reason advanced for moving OSI from DDI to DDC&T in 1963. We are not in a position to know how important this consideration has actually turned out to

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be. It has been my observation, however, that OSI personnel analyzing intelligence information to report out S&T developments are not interchangeable with the scientist hired to work in ORD or OEL, and much less so in the case of OCS and OSA, but instead retain a close similarity of interest with other analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence. I would be in favor of all OSI personnel who wished to remain in the S&T career service doing so, and of course closest coordination and cooperation would remain in the mutual interest of the two Directorates. Cooperation would be simpler and better, however, because of clean lines of responsibility as between the R&D and technical collection operators on the one hand and the evaluator-analysts on the other.

15. I would note that the timing of the decision to make a change is at present ideal in view of Dr. Wheelon's announced intention to emphasize and expand DDC&T work on R&D (ORD, OCS) and Technical Collection Programs (OSA, Special Projects Staff, OEL).

16. The above discussion is sufficient reason to make a modest change of this sort in our organization for the purpose of improving cost-effectiveness, saving manpower, avoiding duplication, and establishing clean functional lines of command.

17. Recommendation

I recommend in view of the above, you approve in principle the transfer back to DDI of OSI, subject to submitting to you for final review and approval the details of such a move as worked out by DDI in coordination with DDC&T and the Executive Director's EPAM Staff.



(RAY S. CLINE

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Recommendation in para. 17 is APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

Attachments

Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000500160025-5

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W/100/100/100

O/DDI:PABoel:fbr:4 September 1965

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Distribution:

Orig. - DDI

1 - ER

1 - O/DDI Chrono

1 - FAB Chrono

1 - O/DDI Organization File

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY


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ATTACHMENTS

- Tab A: Proposed Grouping of Offices under DDI Direction**
- Tab B: Present Group of Offices Engaged in Intelligence Research and Analysis in Support of National Intelligence**
- Tab C: Proposed Intelligence Research Group of the Directorate of Intelligence**
- Tab D: Schedule of Projected Manpower Savings**
- Tab E: Organization Chart of ORR**
- Tab F: Organization Chart of OSI**
- Tab G: Organization Chart of FMSAC**

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Proposed Grouping of Offices Under DDI Direction



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Present Group of Offices
Engaged in Intelligence Research and Analysis
in Support of National Intelligence

RECAP



ORR
OSI
FMSAC
RESEARCH
STAFF
Total

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**Proposed Intelligence Research Group
of the Directorate of Intelligence**


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RECAP

25X1 *DIRECTION*
EXECUTIVE STAFF:
Production Control
Administration
RESEARCH STAFF:
Current Support
Strategic Studies

OEI
OSI
OMSPA
FSC

Reserve
Total new T/O
25X1 *Present T/O*
Reduction



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TAB D

SCHEDULE OF PROJECTED MANPOWER SAVINGS

- I. Reduction of staff components effected through merger*
- II. Elimination of duplication in chemicals, electronics, agriculture
- III. Elimination of research in fields of marginal intelligence value
- IV. Elimination of duplication and reassignment of effort on military intelligence among OCI/Military Division, OSI, ORR/NRA
- V. Reduction of load on CGS
- Total

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<u>Function</u>	<u>ORR</u>	<u>OSI</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>New Grouping</u>	<u>Reduction</u>
Direction					
Administrative					
Production Control					
Current Support					
Total					

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
** Figure of is target reduction and represents probable up-range. See TAB C for recap of minimal estimated reduction of , representing the probable lower range.

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OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS




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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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
4 August 1965

OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE



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FOREIGN MISSILE AND SPACE ANALYSIS CENTER



ORGANIZATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

HR 1, fig. 8a

Note for the Record:

STAT Per this is a dead issue.

11 June 1966